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I explore the role of participants’ relationships with borrowers and lead arrangers in syndicated 
lending. I predict and find that these relationships mitigate the information asymmetry problems 
faced by participants with both borrowers and lead arrangers, and allow participants to take a larger 
share in the loan. In particular, participants with a borrower relationship take, on average, a 10% 
larger share of the loan, with the effect being more pronounced when the borrower is 
informationally opaque or less conservative in its accounting. Similarly, participants with a lead 
arranger relationship take, on average, a 9% larger share of the loan, with the effect being more 
pronounced: (i) when the borrower has engaged in accounting irregularities or covenant violations 
in the past, (ii) when the lead arranger is a repeat lender or a large lender, and (iii) when participants 
have limited information acquisition capacity. Furthermore, loans with a larger total share taken 
by participants with a borrower or lead arranger relationship are associated with a smaller lead 
arranger share, less concentrated loan syndicate structure, a lower loan spread, and a lower upfront 
fee, consistent with these relationships mitigating information asymmetry. Overall, my study sheds 
light on how participant-level relationship lending shapes debt contracting.  
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The syndicated loan market represents a substantial and increasing portion of capital 
markets.1 A syndicated loan typically involves lead arrangers, who originate and administer the 
loan, and participant lenders, who as a group take the majority portion of the credit balance. The 
nature of syndicated debt contracting results in information asymmetry not only between the 
participants and the borrower but also between the participants and the lead arrangers. Theory 
models predict that, to mitigate this information asymmetry, uninformed lenders (i.e., participants) 
require informed lenders (i.e., lead arrangers) to take a large share of the loan, so that informed 
lenders have incentives to engage in appropriate levels of due diligence and monitoring 
(Holmstrom 1979; Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Consistent with the theory, empirical studies find 
that lead arrangers take a larger stake in loans requiring greater due diligence and monitoring (e.g., 
Simons 1993; Dennis and Mullineaux 2000; Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Jones et al. 2005; Sufi 
2007; Amiram et al. 2016).  
In this study, I focus on an additional mechanism that can help to mitigate information 
asymmetry, namely, participants’ past relationships with the borrower and the lead arrangers. Past 
transactions with the same borrower provide participants with proprietary information about the 
borrower’s risk taking, and thus help them in the assessment of the borrower’s credit worthiness. 
Similarly, participation in past syndicates with the same lead arranger can help participants to 
assess the lead arranger’s due diligence and monitoring ability. Thus, from a participant’s 
perspective, a participant-borrower relationship (hereinafter PBR) helps to mitigate information 
asymmetry problems with the borrower, while a participant-lead arranger relationship (hereinafter 
PLR) helps to mitigate information asymmetry problems with the lead arranger. Hence, I predict 
                                                 
1 In 2012, global syndicated loans raised $3.3 trillion, more than 5 times the $0.6 trillion raised by global equity 
markets. Global syndicated loans rose to 4.6 trillion in 2014 (Thomson Reuters). 
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that these two relationships will influence loan contracting outcomes at both the participant and 
the loan level. In particular, I examine how PBR and PLR affect three outcomes: individual 
participants’ share in the loan, loan syndicate structure, and cost of debt. My primary analyses 
focus on how PBR and PLR influence the amount of a loan an individual participant retains. 
Understanding the determinants of a participant’s share in the loan is important because 
participants as a group typically take the majority share of the loan. Also, prior studies tend to treat 
participants as a group having identical information asymmetry problems, ignoring potential 
heterogeneity among participants (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Dennis and Mullineaux 
2000). In contrast, I identify a key source of this heterogeneity - past relationships with borrowers 
and lead arrangers - and examine its consequences. 
To conduct this investigation, I examine a sample of 5,989 loan packages between 1990 and 
2012. I construct an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has lent to the same borrower 
within the past 5 years (capturing the participant-borrower relationship, PBR) and an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the participant has joined a syndicate with the same lead arranger (for any 
borrower) within the past 5 years (capturing the participant-lead arranger relationship, PLR).2 
From the previous loans with the borrower (PBR), participants get the information memorandum 
about the borrower before loan initiation and information updates about the borrower’s credit risk 
after loan initiation, while from the previous loans with the lead arranger (PLR), participants obtain 
information about the lead arranger’s loan origination and loan monitoring activities. 
                                                 
2 PLR and PBR are independent of each other. Participants without a borrower relationship (i.e., PBR=0) can obtain 
a lead arranger relationship (i.e., PLR=1) from the lead arranger’s prior syndicates with other borrowers, while 
participants without a lead arranger relationship (i.e., PLR=0) can obtain a borrower relationship (i.e., PBR=1) from 




I predict that these relationships will reduce the information asymmetry problems faced by 
participants and allow them to take a larger share in the loan. Consistent with this argument, I find 
that participants with PBR (PLR) take a 10% (9%) larger share of the loan. These results hold after 
controlling for participant characteristics, borrower characteristics, lead arranger characteristics 
and loan characteristics, as well as borrower fixed effects and year fixed effects. They are also 
robust to measuring the intensity of PBR and PLR, rather than their presence.   
Next, I examine how cross-sectional characteristics of borrowers, lead arrangers and 
participants affect the importance of these relationships in syndicated lending. As for borrower 
characteristics, I examine borrowers’ information opacity, accounting conservatism, past 
accounting irregularities and previous loan performance. First, prior literature finds that 
relationship lending (i.e., the past relationship between the lead arranger and the borrower) is more 
valuable when opaque borrowers have less public information available (e.g., Berger and Udell 
1995;  Bharath et al. 2007;  Khan et al. 2016). Similarly, I predict that the effect of PBR on 
participants’ share in the loan is larger for opaque borrowers because past transactions with the 
same borrower endow participants with an information advantage and decrease their information 
asymmetry, allowing them to take a larger share in the loan. Following prior studies, I define a 
borrower to be informationally opaque when it is small (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 1994), not rated 
by credit rating agencies (e.g., Sufi 2007) or has low analyst following (e.g., Mansi et al. 2011). 
Consistent with my predictions, the effect of PBR on participants’ share in the loan is larger by 
63% for small borrowers, 35% for non-credit rated borrowers and 30% for borrowers with low 
analyst following (relative, respectively, to larger borrowers, rated borrowers and borrowers with 
high analyst following).  
In addition, Erkens et al. (2014) find that relationship lending reduces lenders’ demand for 
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conservative accounting. Similarly, I predict that the effect of PBR on participants’ share in the 
loan is larger for less conservative borrowers because participants’ information advantage 
decreases their information asymmetry with such borrowers, allowing them to take a larger share 
in the loan. I define borrower conservatism using the firm-year level conservatism score in Khan 
and Watts (2009). Consistent with my predictions, the effect of PBR on participants’ share in the 
loan is larger by 28% for loans with less conservative borrowers.  
I also expect that the effect of PLR on participants’ share is stronger when borrowers engaged 
in accounting irregularities or covenant violations in the past, because participants with a lead 
arranger relationship have more knowledge and trust in the lead arranger’s ability to monitor such 
borrowers and avoid future accounting irregularities and covenant violations, allowing them to 
take a larger share in the loan. I examine accounting irregularities by Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAER) and material financial statement restatements. Consistent with my 
predictions, the effect of PLR on participants’ share in the loan is larger, respectively, by 118%, 
86% and 105% for borrowers with AAER, restatements and covenant violations. 
As for lead arrangers’ characteristics, I predict that the effect of PLR on participants’ share 
is larger in the presence of a repeat lead arranger (i.e., when the lead arranger has a prior 
relationship with the borrower) and a large lead arranger (i.e., when the lead arranger is among the 
five largest lead arrangers in terms of market share) because they incur lower information gathering 
and monitoring cost and have stronger reputation incentives, allowing participants to place more 
value on PLR in their share decisions (i.e., the quality of PLR is higher). Indeed, I find that the 
effect of PLR on participants’ share is larger by 67% in the presence of a repeat lead arranger and 
by 70% in the presence of a large lead arranger. 
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Finally, with respect to participants’ characteristics, I predict that the association between 
PLR and participants’ share is more pronounced when participants are limited in their capacity to 
evaluate the credit worthiness of the borrower (empirically identified as participants that are small 
or growing fast). Small or growing participants are likely to be constrained in their ability to 
evaluate the loan information independently, as they typically have small credit risk evaluation 
teams and less experience in syndicated lending. Therefore, they will put greater weight on PLR 
in their share decisions because a lead arranger that they have a relationship with can help them to 
better assess loan information. Consistent with this prediction, the effect of PLR on participants’ 
share is larger for participants with capacity limits.  
Next, I examine the role of PBR and PLR in mitigating information asymmetry in loan 
syndicate structure and cost of debt. First, I explore the effect of PBR and PLR on loan syndicate 
structure. Prior literature shows that lead arrangers’ share and the loan concentration index in the 
loan represents participants’ demand for loan quality certification and monitoring (e.g., Simons 
1993; Lee and Mullineaux 2004). If PBR and PLR reduce information asymmetry as predicted, 
then when participants with PBR or PLR take a larger share of the loan, the need for a larger lead 
arrangers’ share and a more concentrated loan syndicate structure should be lower. Consistent with 
this prediction, I find that the total share taken by participants with PBR or PLR is negatively 
related to the lead arrangers’ share and the loan concentration index. Second, I explore the effect 
of PBR ad PLR on cost of debt. Previous research shows that loan spread is affected by 
participants’ demand for information asymmetry compensation (e.g., Ivashina 2009; Gadanecz et 
al. 2012; Amiram et al. 2016). If PBR and PLR reduce information asymmetry as predicted, I 
expect that the total share taken by participants with PBR or PLR is negatively related to loan 
spread. My analyses confirm this prediction. In particular, one standard deviation increase in the 
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total share taken by participants with PBR (PLR) decreases loan spread by 1.7 (17.3) basis points. 
I also find that one standard deviation increase in the total share taken by participants with PLR 
decreases the upfront fee by 5.8 basis points.  
Finally, I provide preliminary evidence on how participant-level relationship lending 
impacts incomplete debt contracting.3  In particular, I find that a loan package with a greater share 
taken by participants with PLR is more likely to be renegotiated, consistent with PLR lowering 
renegotiation costs (assuming that the ex-post deal amendment is a proxy for the ex-ante difficulty 
in obtaining support for the amendment by a majority of the lenders). Also, I examine the 
likelihood of interest-increase-only performance pricing and interest-decrease-only performance 
pricing features. As noted by Asquith et al. (2005), interest-increase-only performance pricing 
captures concerns with the moral hazard problem, because lenders that suffer from the moral 
hazard problem have the incentive to retain the right to increase interest if lead arrangers or 
borrowers shirk. In contrast, interest-decrease-only performance pricing captures concerns with 
the adverse selection problem, because lenders that suffer from the adverse selection problem and 
require a higher loan spread, may give the borrower a chance to reduce the loan spread ex-post. I 
find that a larger share taken by participants with PLR is associated with the lower likelihood of 
interest-increase-only performance pricing, while a larger share taken by participants with PBR is 
associated with the lower likelihood of interest-decrease-only performance pricing. Thus, I provide 
evidence that PLR helps to reduce the moral hazard problem, while PBR is more effective in 
mitigating the adverse selection problem. 
                                                 
3 Incomplete debt contracting refers to the situation where lenders worry about future realizations and cannot 
contract ex-ante for each future state. So they use renegotiation, performance pricing and other contracting features 
to help them allocate control rights and better contract for uncertainties in the future (Christensen et al. 2015).   
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My study contributes to a growing literature on syndicated loans. Prior studies have 
highlighted the importance of lead arranger-level relationship lending for debt contracting terms.  
For example, Bharath et al. (2011) shows that, in syndicated lending, borrowing from the same 
lead arranger lowers cost of debt, reduces collateral requirements and increases loan amount. At 
the same time, most of this literature assumes that participant lenders are homogeneous, 
uninformed lenders and they primarily depend on the lead arranger’s skin in the game to ensure 
due diligence and monitoring. For example, Sufi (2007) finds that lead arrangers take a larger share 
when the borrower is opaque and thus requires more due diligence and monitoring, while Ivashina 
(2009) finds that a larger lead arrangers’ share is associated with a lower cost of debt. In contrast, 
I relax this assumption and focus on a specific source of heterogeneity among participants: 
participants’ past relationships with the borrower or the lead arranger. That is, I focus on 
relationship lending at the participant-level, rather than at the lead arranger-level, and examine its 
effects on key debt contracting outcomes.  
A few studies have begun to explore some aspects of participant-level relationship lending. 
Sufi (2007) finds that lead arrangers are more likely to include participants with a borrower 
relationship when the borrower is informationally opaque, while Champagne and Kryzanowski 
(2007) find that participants with a lead arranger relationship are more likely to join the same lead 
arranger’s future syndicates. Both studies, however, only examine the participants’ decision to join 
the syndicate. I expand the investigation to the participant’s loan share decision and to a series of 
loan-level outcomes (lead arrangers’ share, loan concentration, loan spread, upfront fee, 
renegotiation, and performance pricing). Besides, I consider both types of relationships (i.e., PBR 
and PLR) simultaneously.4 Overall, my study provides the first, in-depth and comprehensive 
                                                 
4 Another related study is Gadanecz et al. (2012), who find that participants with borrower relationships demand less 
compensation for information asymmetry in the form of lower loan spread. However, they do not examine the effect 
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analysis of how participants’ relationships mitigate their information asymmetry with respect to 
the borrower and the lead arrangers, by showing the impact of these relationships on loan syndicate 
structure and the terms of syndicated loans. Also, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first 
study to investigate the determinants of participants’ share in the loan, an important question since 
participants as a group typically take the majority share of the loan.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional 
background, the related literature and develops my hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample 
selection and the empirical design. Section 4 reports the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Institutional Background, Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
A syndicated loan involves two or more lenders jointly contracting with a borrower under 
the same credit agreement. Among the syndicate lenders, one or more lead arrangers take the lead 
of the credit and assume the responsibility of administering the loan for participating lenders. It is 
common for borrowers to hire multiple lead arrangers for their different competitive advantages 
in performing different duties (François and Missonier‐Piera 2007). Lead arrangers benefit by 
getting arrangement and underwriting fees while spreading risk and credit among participants. 
Participants benefit by obtaining access to the loan and risk diversification without incurring 
origination costs and facing service burdens. The syndicated loan market is growing rapidly, 
largely because it combines features of sole-lender loans that sophisticated lenders can coordinate 
their effort to act as a group to screen, monitor and renegotiate, with the benefits of public debt 
contracts, namely, longer terms, larger credit amounts and looser covenants (Dennis and 
Mullineaux 2000; Ball et al. 2008).  
2.1. Information Asymmetry and Participant-Level Relationships in Syndicated Lending 
                                                 
of borrower relationships on participants’ share decision nor on the loan syndicate structure (lead arranger’s share 
and loan concentration), and they do not examine the participant-lead arranger relationship. 
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Participants’ information asymmetry problems come from the syndication process in which 
participants delegate the loan screening and monitoring role to the lead arranger. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) describes the loan syndication process with an emphasis 
on participants’ own credit risk assessment as follows.5 In the pre-launch phase, the lead arranger 
collects loan information and prepares an information memorandum based on the information 
provided by the borrower. In the launch phase, potential participants get the information 
memorandum and meet with the borrower and the lead arranger to discuss the borrower’s business 
and negotiate pricing and other terms. In this phase, as emphasized by practitioners, participants’ 
own information acquisition about the borrower and the lead arranger plays a key role.6   
In the post launch phase, participants decide whether to join the syndication by doing their 
due diligence and credit approval, including running projection models with stress tests based on 
business and industry research. In the post-closing phase, participants discuss the borrower’s 
financial/operating performance with the borrower and the lead arranger and follow quarterly 
updates on the borrower’s covenant compliance. Every year, participants join meetings to obtain 
borrower information updates and assess the loan protection level based on annual credit analyses 
prepared by the lead arranger. If loan renegotiation is necessary, participants also obtain relevant 
proprietary borrower information to vote on loan amendments.  
The delegation process impacts participants’ information asymmetry with both the borrower 
and the lead arranger. With respect to the borrower, the participant is subject to the same 
                                                 
5 For more detail, see Section 3-2 of FDIC’s definition of syndicated loan phases available on: 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section3-2.pdf 
6 Mugasha (1998) notes that the syndicate manager does not owe legal fiduciary duties to the participants, because 
participants are sophisticated parties with knowledgeable syndication departments and thus they are well equipped 
to carefully study loan quality and lead arranger quality before accepting the terms of the loan, and because 
participants engage in a direct contracting relationship with the borrower, not the lead arranger. However, lead 
arrangers still face legal risks if they negligently or purposely misrepresent any borrower information that causes the 
participants to contract with the borrower and incur losses. 
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information problem faced by the lead arranger. That is, the participant-borrower information 
asymmetry problem (hereinafter PBIAP) is the same as the well-documented lead arranger-
borrower information asymmetry problem (hereinafter LBIAP), which consists of (i) an adverse 
selection problem, arising from the possibility that the borrower does not disclose all relevant 
credit quality information, and (ii) a moral hazard problem, due to the fact that the borrower may 
act against the lenders’ interests. It is important to note that because the lead arranger, due to 
disclosure costs or misreporting incentives, makes imperfect disclosures to participants, PBIAP is 
typically more severe than LBIAP.  
With respect to the lead arranger, participants suffer from what I will refer to as a participant-
lead arranger information asymmetry problem (hereinafter PLIAP). This problem arises because 
the delegation process makes it necessary for participants to get information about the lead 
arranger’s due diligence and monitoring activities and such information acquisition may not be 
perfect. PLIAP consists of (i) an adverse selection problem, when the lead arranger does not 
disclose all relevant information about loan quality, and (ii) a moral hazard problem, when the 
lead arranger engages in opportunistic monitoring activities. The moral hazard problem is 
especially relevant in syndicated lending, because lead arrangers do not take the whole share in 
the loan, and thus do not enjoy the full benefit of monitoring.  
It is important to emphasize that even when the delegation process involves no information 
loss and thus there is no information asymmetry between the participant and the lead arranger (i.e., 
no PLIAP), the participant still faces the information asymmetry problem with the borrower (i.e., 
PBIAP). At the same time, even if a participant has perfect borrower information (i.e., no PBIAP), 
she would still face the information asymmetry problem with the lead arranger (i.e., PLIAP), 
because the perfect borrower information does not eliminate the lead arranger’s incentives to shirk 
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with respect to monitoring. 
Banking theory has examined the general lender-borrower information asymmetry 
problem.  Diamond (1984) studies a joint-monitoring setting and shows that delegated financial 
intermediaries face incentive problems when there is information asymmetry about their 
monitoring activities and when they do not receive the full benefits from monitoring – a situation 
similar to the case of lead arrangers in syndicated loans. Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) speak directly to the lead arranger’s incentive problem and its impact on participants. 
In their setting, the lead arranger is an informed lender that performs due diligence and monitoring, 
while participants are uninformed lenders that rely on the lead arranger’s monitoring and 
information. However, the lead arranger’s action is unobservable, which gives the lead arranger 
incentive to take opportunistic actions that are not in the best interest of participants. To solve this 
incentive problem, participants require the lead arranger to take a large enough share in the loan. 
Unlike the settings in Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997),  I relax the 
assumption that participants are uninformed and predict that participants with a borrower 
relationship will obtain proprietary information about the borrower that helps mitigate the PBIAP 
in a subsequent deal, while participants with a lead arranger relationship will obtain information 
about the lead arranger’s due diligence and monitoring that helps mitigate the PLIAP in a 
subsequent deal. Therefore, participants with a borrower or a lead arranger relationship (i.e., with 
PBR or PLR) will be inclined to take a larger share in the loan. Thus, I state my first research 
hypothesis as follows: 
H1 – Participants with a borrower or a lead arranger relationship take a larger share in 
the loan.  
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In essence, while prior literature has focused on the lead arranger’s share as a key 
mechanism used by participants to protect themselves from information asymmetry problems, I 
propose that past relationships with the borrower and the lead arrangers also mitigate this problem.  
A few prior studies have identified the importance of these relationships for the participants’ 
decision to join the syndicate. For example, Sufi (2007) finds that lead arrangers are more likely 
to include participants with a borrower relationship when the borrower is informationally opaque, 
while Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007) find that participants with a lead arranger relationship 
are more likely to be invited to the same lead arranger’s future syndicates. However, these findings 
do not imply a similar result for the participants’ decision concerning the share of the loan. First, 
participants with a borrower or a lead arranger relationship might want to take a smaller share to 
diversify risk (across borrowers and across lead arrangers), especially when they have outstanding 
loans with the same borrower or the same lead arranger because of the relationship. Thus, past 
relationships with the borrower or the lead arranger may have no association or a negative 
association with participants’ share in the loan. Second, no matter what the prior information 
endowment of the participant is, lead arrangers and borrowers can help level the playing field for 
all participants, as lead arrangers may potentially benefit from taking a smaller share and borrowers 
may benefit from a lower cost of debt. Therefore, the previous information endowment brought by 
relationship lending can be irrelevant.7 Hence, the prediction in H1 is not without tension.  
2.1.1. Cross-Sectional Predictions: Borrower Characteristics  
2.1.1.1. Borrower Information Opacity 
                                                 
7 In addition, even if the participants without any relationships are informationally inferior, they can observe how 
much participants with relationships take, and use such share-taking observations as a signal of how much they can 
take. In other words, participants without PBR and PLR can take as much share as participants with PBR and PLR 
because the two kinds of participants face the same major benefit (loan spread) and cost (default risk). In this case, 
relationship lending can also be potentially irrelevant. 
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An opaque borrower has a larger PBIAP, with a more severe adverse selection problem 
with respect to loan quality and a more severe moral hazard problem from the borrower’s 
opportunistic actions against participants’ interests.  Indeed, using different proxies for opacity, a 
number of studies find that relationship lending is more beneficial for opaque borrowers.  For 
example,  Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that for small and thus potentially more opaque firms, 
borrowing from a previous lender results in greater access to capital and a lower cost of debt. 
Similarly, Berger and Udell (1995) argue that smaller firms suffer more from asymmetric 
information problems, and borrowers with a longer banking relationship  pay lower interest rates 
and are less likely to be required to pledge collateral.  More recently,  Sufi (2007) predicts that 
borrowers that have no credit rating or are not listed suffer more from information asymmetry 
problems and finds that, for those borrowers, participants require lead arrangers to take a larger 
share in the loan. Bharath et al. (2007) show that loans originated by repeat lead arrangers have 
lower cost of debt, with the effect being more pronounced when the borrower is less transparent. 
Khan et al. (2016) find that a lender’s relationship with a manager is not only specific to the firm 
where the relationship developed, but also migrate to other firms that the manager joins, especially 
if the new firm is informationally opaque.   
Along the same lines, I predict that PBR is more important when lending to opaque 
borrowers because past transactions with the borrower endow participants with an information 
advantage and decrease PBIAP, thus allowing them to take a larger share in the loan. I do not make 
predictions for PLR because it is not clear whether a past relationship between the participant and 
the lead arranger helps mitigate the severe PBIAP for more opaque borrowers. My research 
hypothesis 2.1 is thus stated as follows: 
H2.1 – The effect of PBR on participants’ share is larger for opaque borrowers. 
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2.1.1.2. Borrowers’ Accounting Conservatism 
Borrowers’ accounting conservatism helps lenders to observe early signals about the 
borrowers’ default risk (Zhang 2008). These signals are less important for lenders that have a 
borrower relationship because these lenders have customer-specific information that facilitates 
monitoring (e.g., Boot 2000; Bharath et al. 2011). Consistently, Erkens et al. (2014) find that 
lenders with a borrower relationship have lower demand for conservative accounting. Along the 
same lines, I predict that PBR is more important when lending to less conservative borrowers 
because past transactions with the borrower endow participants with an information advantage and 
decrease participants’ demand for conservatism, thus allowing them to take a larger share in the 
loan. I do not make predictions for PLR because it is not clear whether a past relationship between 
the participant and the lead arranger lowers the participant’s demand for accounting conservatism. 
My research hypothesis 2.2 is thus stated as follows: 
H2.2 – The effect of PBR on participants’ share is larger for less conservative borrowers. 
2.1.1.3. Borrowers’ Past Accounting Irregularities 
Past accounting irregularities have an adverse impact on lenders’ views of the borrower’s 
default risk, resulting in stricter lending terms. After a material restatement, lenders offer substantially 
less favorable loan terms to borrowers (Graham et al. 2008). As for firms with allegedly misstated 
financial statements, the enforcement actions by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
(i.e., the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases) result in forced management 
turnovers, negative abnormal returns, higher bid-ask spreads and lower analyst following (Feroz et al. 
1991; Dechow et al. 1996).   
I predict that participants value a lead arranger relationship more (and, thus, take a larger 
share in the loan) when borrowers have engaged in accounting irregularities because they can rely 
on the lead arranger’s ability to monitor such borrowers. In contrast, I do not make a similar 
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prediction for participants with a borrower relationship, since private information about the 
borrower does not mitigate the adverse impact of borrower accounting irregularities. As a result, 
my research hypothesis 2.3 is stated as follows: 
H2.3 – The effect of PLR on participants’ share is larger for borrowers with accounting 
irregularities. 
2.1.1.4. Borrowers’ Previous Loan Performance 
Covenant violations indicate the borrower’s failure to comply with loan contracting agreements 
and thus directly affect the lender’s trust in the borrower.  As a consequence, borrowers suffer from an 
increase in interest rates, a decline in investments, and an increase in management turnover (e.g., 
Roberts and Sufi 2009; Nini et al. 2012).  
I predict that participants value a lead arranger relationship more (and, thus, take a larger 
share in the loan) when borrowers have performed poorly in past loans (i.e., they violated 
covenants) because they can rely on the lead arranger’s ability to monitor such borrowers and 
avoid future covenant violations. In contrast, I do not make a similar prediction for participants 
with a borrower relationship, since private information about the borrower does not necessarily 
mitigate the risk of future covenant violations. My research hypothesis 2.4 is thus stated as follows: 
H2.4 – The effect of PLR on participants’ share is larger for borrowers who have 
performed poorly in past loans. 
2.1.2. Cross-Sectional Predictions: Lead Arranger Characteristics  
           Lead arranger characteristics may help reduce the PLIAP and thus affect the relation 
between PLR and participants’ share. I focus on two kinds of lead arrangers: repeat lead arrangers 
(i.e., lead arrangers who already have a relationship with the borrower) and large lead arrangers 
(i.e., lead arrangers with a large market share in the syndicated loan market).  
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Repeat lead arrangers have lower borrower-specific information gathering costs and incur 
smaller monitoring costs (due to their ongoing relationships with the borrower). Besides, they want 
to protect their reputation with the borrower to maintain the relationship. As a result, I predict that 
participants can rely more on PLR to solve the moral hazard problem when there is a repeat lead 
arranger. As for large lead arrangers, because of their resources and experience in the syndicated 
lending, they generally incur lower information gathering costs and smaller monitoring costs. Also, 
they have strong incentives to protect their reputation in the market. Thus, I predict that participants 
rely more on PLR to solve the moral hazard problem when there is a large lead arranger. These 
arguments echo similar arguments in the literature. For example, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) 
show that lead arranger reputation increases the likelihood of loan syndication. Sufi (2007) finds 
that repeat lead arrangers help mitigate, but do not fully eliminate, the information asymmetry 
problem in debt contracting. Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman (2012) document that borrowers 
with loans originated by large lead arrangers realize better future performances. Chaudhry and 
Kleimeier (2015) show that lead arrangers’ market share and their information advantage from 
repeat lending to the same borrower decrease lead arrangers’ share of the loan and loan 
concentration index.  
As for PBR, I do not make a directional prediction, since it is not clear whether the value 
of the participant’s relationship with the borrower is affected by the lead arranger characteristics. 
Accordingly, my third research hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3 – The effect of PLR on participants’ share is larger for repeat lead arrangers and large 
lead arrangers. 
2.1.3. Cross-Sectional Predictions: Participant Characteristics 
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I conjecture that participants that are small or growing fast have limited capacity to evaluate 
the loan information independently, as they have less experience in syndicated lending. Also, small 
participants include many regional and community banks with limited credit risk assessment 
capacities. Similarly, fast growing participants are typically smaller, and their credit risk 
assessment capacity may need time to catch up with their growth. Therefore, PLR can help 
participants with information acquisition capacity issues to better evaluate loan quality, leading 
me to predict that the effect of PLR on participants’ share is higher for participants with limited 
information acquisition capacity. 8  
In contrast, the prediction on PBR is not ex-ante clear, because small or fast growing 
participants may not be able to fully exploit their past relationships with borrowers due to their 
limited capacity. Accordingly, I state my fourth research hypothesis as follows:  
H4 – The effect of PLR on participants’ share is larger for participants with information 
acquisition capacity limits. 
2.2. Participant-Level Relationships and Loan Syndicate Structure 
Prior literature on loan syndicate structure consistently finds that lead arrangers retain a 
larger share in loans that need more due diligence and monitoring. For example, prior literature 
shows that the lead arranger’s share is larger when borrowers have lower examiner ratings (Simons 
1993) or when the lead arrangers is less reputable (Dennis and Mullineaux 2000). Along the same 
lines, Lee and Mullineaux (2004) show that syndicates are more concentrated when the borrower 
is more opaque and thus entails higher credit risk.  Finally, Sufi (2007) shows that the lead arranger 
                                                 
8 A second rationale for my prediction on PLR is that small participants with a lead arranger relationship may be 
more willing to take a larger share in the loan if they believe that doing so will lead them to be invited by the same 
lead arranger in future syndicate deals. Along these lines, Champagne and Kryzanowski (2007) find that participants 
with a lead arranger relationship are more likely to be invited to the same lead arranger’s future syndicate deals. 
They, however, do not examine whether this likelihood increases with the participant’s share in the loan. 
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retains a larger share and forms a more concentrated syndicate to mitigate the moral hazard 
problem when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence.  
Overall, these studies suggest that a greater lead arrangers’ share and greater loan 
concentration are used to mitigate concerns with loan quality and moral hazard. In a similar vein, 
I predict that the presence of participants with a past relationship with the borrower and lead 
arrangers may mitigate these concerns, and thus it will be associated with lower lead arrangers’ 
share and lower loan concentration, leading to the following hypothesis: 
H5 – The higher the share of the loan taken by participants with a borrower relationship 
or a lead arranger relationship, the lower the lead arranger’s share in the loan and the lower the 
loan concentration.  
2.3. Participant-Level Relationships and Cost of Debt 
Previous studies  find that a lead arranger’s past relationship with the borrower is associated 
with a lower cost of debt (Bharath et al. 2011), consistent with the notion that relationship lending 
reduces the demand for an information asymmetry risk premium. In contrast, Rajan (1992) argues 
that relationship lending may result in hold-up problems with incumbent relationship banks 
exploiting their information rents and charging higher interest rates. Consistent with this theory’s 
prediction, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000), when investigating European small businesses,  find 
that longer bank-firm relationships are associated with higher interest rates. However, the 
argument in Rajan (1992) seems to apply to the lead arranger’s relationship, since only the lead 
arranger can exploit the hold-up problem. In the case of participants, I predict that relationship 
lending will result in a lower loan spread.  
Note that prior literature usually defines cost of debt as the loan spread (i.e., the amount a 
borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down including any annual fees), 
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but it overlooks any upfront fees that the borrower pays to the lenders at loan initiation. The upfront 
fee is often tiered, with the lead arranger receiving the major amount for the loan origination. 
According to Gadanecz (2004), the upfront fee paid to the lead arranger includes an arrangement 
fee that compensates for the cost of lead arrangers putting the deal together, and an underwriting 
fee that compensates for the risk of lead arrangers guaranteeing the availability of the fund. This 
guarantee means that in case of attracting insufficient participants, lead arrangers need to absorb 
the unallocated amount. Consistent with the view that the upfront fee compensates for syndication 
cost and syndication risk, Berg et al. (2015) find that the upfront fee increases with borrowers’ 
equity and profit volatility.  
Overall, the upfront fee is part of the total borrowing cost that is not captured by loan spread 
and has different functions as an additional cost of debt: while the loan spread mainly compensates 
for information asymmetry risk and default risk during the loan outstanding period, the upfront fee 
mainly compensates for loan syndication cost and syndication risk at loan initiation. Given that 
the loan spread and the upfront fee capture different aspects of cost of debt,   I examine both of 
them in Hypothesis 6. I predict that the loan spread will be lower for participants with a borrower 
relationship or a lead arranger relationship because these participants demand lower compensation 
for information asymmetry risk. I predict that the upfront fee will also be lower for participants 
with a borrower relationship or a lead arranger relationship because these relationships can 
decrease the cost of lead arrangers putting the deal together (i.e., syndication cost decreases), as 
well as decrease the risk of lead arranger absorbing the remaining amount of unsuccessful 
participation (i.e., syndication risk decreases). Therefore, H6 is stated as follows:  
H6 – The higher the share of the loan taken by participants with a borrower relationship 
or a lead arranger relationship, the lower the cost of debt for the borrower. 
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 Preliminary support for this hypothesis regarding loan spread and borrower relationship is 
already in Gadanecz et al. (2012), who find that participants with a borrower relationship demand 
a lower loan spread. However, they do not investigate the cases of participants with a lead arranger 
relationship and the additional cost of debt measured by the upfront fee. 
3. Sample Selection and Empirical Design 
3.1. Sample Selection 
To determine the role of participant relationships in syndicated lending, I start with 
syndicated loan package data available in Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan database from 
1990 to 2012. I merge loan package data  with Compustat through the linking table provided by 
Chava and Roberts (2008) to identify nonfinancial U.S. firms with financial information available.9  
For these loans, I obtain lender information from DealScan. Similar to Bharath et al. (2011) and 
Sufi (2007), I define lenders as lead arrangers when the variable “Lead Arranger Credit” is defined 
as “Yes”.10 The rest of the lenders in a loan package are defined as participants. To focus on 
syndicated loans with both lead arrangers and participants, I delete loans when no lead arranger is 
identified, and when there is no participant identified in sole-lender loans. To identify participant-
borrower relationships, I require each loan package in my sample to have at least one prior loan 
package for the same borrower in the previous 5 years.  Next, I restrict my sample to loans that 
have data on loan share allocation and loan spread, my two primary dependent variables. Finally, 
I require firm-level control variables (specifically, a borrower’s total assets, net income before 
                                                 
9 My sample ends at 2012 because it’s the last year covered in the linking table provided by Chava and Roberts 
(2008) in Dealscan.  
10 For 8% of loan packages there is no lender with the variable “Lead Arranger Credit” defined as “Yes”. For these 
loan packages, I define a lender as lead arranger if it performs any of the five roles most frequently associated with 
lenders for whom “Lead Arranger Credit” is defined as “Yes”, namely, Administrative Agent (46%), Agent (27%), 
Arranger (10%), Syndications Agent (8%) and Book Runner (2%). For robustness, I exclude these loan packages and 
obtain similar results. 
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extraordinary items, long-term debt and net property, plant and equipment) to be available. My 
final sample comprises 5,989 loan packages, which is comparable to prior literature.11 Table 1, 
Panel A summarizes the sample selection process. All variables described in this section are 
detailed in Appendix A. 
3.2. Empirical Design 
To test my hypotheses on how participants’ relationships affect participant share (H1-H4), I 
first employ the following OLS regression at the participant level with package and year fixed 
effects: 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐵𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐿𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 +
𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀.     (1) 
My dependent variable is Participant Share, which is defined as the amount of the loan 
taken by a participant divided by the total amount of the loan.12 My participant-level variables of 
interest are PBR (participant-borrower relationship) and PLR (participant-lead arranger 
relationship). PBR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has lent to the borrower 
within the past 5 years, and 0 otherwise. PLR is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant 
has joined a lead arranger’s syndicate in any other firm within the past 5 years, and 0 otherwise. 
Similar to prior studies (e.g., Bharath et al. 2011), I choose 5 years to measure PBR and PLR 
because 5 years are a long enough period to capture prior loans (the average maturity of a 
                                                 
11 For example, Sufi (2007) has 4,414 loans with available share allocation information over the 1992-2003 period. 
His sample includes both listed and non-listed borrowers. 
12 I focus on participants’ share taken at loan initiation. This may raise a concern with whether loan share will 
change as a result of loan sales in the secondary market. The market of loan sales is smaller than the syndicated loan 
market and mostly for financial distressed borrowers (Dahiya et al. 2003; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008).  This is 
partly due to the complexity of transferring the illiquid loan-asset with non-standardized loan agreements. Also, if 
lenders want to transfer their shares, in most cases they need to get the written consent of the borrower. Borrowers 
typically object to such transfers because of potential added risk of the increased lender pool. Nonetheless, in 
untabulated robustness tests, I exclude institutional loans (737 of the 5,989 loan in my sample), for which loan sales 
are more frequent, and my inferences are unchanged. 
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syndicated loan is about 3.9 years), but not so long to make the information acquired through the 
past relationship irrelevant. In robustness tests, I will examine the sensitivity of the results to 
alternative definitions. 
My participant-level control variables are Industry Exposure and Lender Type. Industry 
Exposure is defined as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is to a borrower in one of the top 
5 industries that the participant has lent to within the prior 3 years, and 0 otherwise. Industry 
Exposure may be a proxy for sector-based diversification needs. I expect a participant with high 
exposure to a given industry to prefer to take a smaller loan share when lending to borrowers in 
that industry.13 On the other hand, it is possible that participants prefer to lend to sectors they have 
specific expertise in and past experience with, leading to predict a positive association. Lender 
Type is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant is a depository institution, and 0 otherwise. 
A depository institution is the typical commercial bank in syndicated lending, while other lenders 
include investment banks and institutional investors. I conjecture that depository institutions, 
traditionally more familiar with the syndicated loan market, may be willing to take a larger share. 
In Equation (1), all the variations come from differences in the participant-level 
characteristics within the same package. Next, I modify Equation (1) to include borrower-level 
and package-level controls and estimate the following OLS regression at the participant level with 
borrower fixed effects (rather than package fixed effects) and year fixed effects: 
𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐵𝑅 + 𝛽3𝑃𝐿𝑅 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 +
𝛽6𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽9 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽10 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽11 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 +
𝛽12 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽13 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 +
                                                 
13 Industry exposure is an imperfect proxy in that it is based on shares held in past loans at initiation. It does not take 
into account any loan sales or CDS trading that may impact the actual risk on the participant’s book.    
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𝛽14 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽15 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 +
𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀.    (2) 
In addition to the four participant-level variables defined in Equation 1, I control for 
borrower-level and package-level variables. As for the former, I include a series of variables 
examined in other studies on loan syndicate structure (e.g., Lee and Mullineaux 2004; Sufi 2007): 
Borrower Size, defined as the natural logarithm of a borrower’s total assets; Profitability,  defined 
as the ratio of a borrower’s net income before extraordinary items to total assets;  Leverage, defined 
as the ratio of a borrower’s long-term debt to total assets; Tangibility, defined as the ratio of a 
borrower’s net PPE to total assets; and Credit Rating Availability, defined as an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating is available for a borrower and 0 
otherwise. All these variables are measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year before loan 
origination, except Credit Rating Availability, which is measured at the end of the most recent 
fiscal month before loan origination (source: Compustat). I expect that when a borrower has larger 
size, higher profitability, lower leverage, higher tangibility and credit rating available, participants 
are more willing to take a larger share in the loan.14 However, these are cross-sectional predictions, 
capturing how participants’ decisions will differ across different borrowers. In my specification, 
with borrower fixed effects, the interpretation of these variables is somewhat different, since I am 
effectively examining how participants’ decisions will differ across packages within the same 
borrower. I will return to this point when discussing my empirical results. 
As for the package-level controls, Lead Arranger Share is defined as the amount of loan 
taken by the lead arranger divided by the total amount of the loan. If there is more than one lead 
                                                 
14 The rationale for these predictions is that larger firms and firms with credit ratings are less informationally 
opaque, more profitable firms and firms with low leverage have greater repayment ability and firms with more 
tangible assets offer greater collateral. Thus, participants are willing to take a larger share of the loan in these firms.  
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arranger, it is calculated as the average percentage of shares of all lead arrangers (following Sufi 
2007).15 Repeat Lead Arranger is defined as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the lead arranger 
has lent to the borrower within the past 5 years, and 0 otherwise, as in Bharath et al. (2011). Large 
Lead Arranger is defined as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the lead arranger is among the top 
5 lead arrangers in terms of syndicated loan market share in the prior year, and 0 otherwise.  
Number of Lead Arrangers is defined as the number of lead arrangers in a loan package. Number 
of Participants is defined as the number of participants in a loan package. I do not control for loan 
package size because it is highly correlated with borrower size (correlation: 0.61; untabulated).  
To test my hypothesis on the effect of participant-borrower relationship and participant-lead 
arranger relationship on loan syndicate structure (H5), I employ the following OLS regression at 
the loan package level with industry and year fixed effects: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐵𝑅 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐿𝑅 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 
+ 𝛽10 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽11𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 
+ 𝛽12𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀. 
(3) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 is alternatively measured as Lead Arranger Share (defined as 
above) or Herfindahl Index, a commonly used loan concentration index calculated as the sum of 
                                                 




squared shares of all lenders in a loan package, theoretically ranging from 0 to 10,000.16 The loan 
syndicate structure test is at the package level since the syndicated loan contract is drafted at the 
package level.17 As a result, the participant-level variables of interest (PBR and PLR in Equation 
(2)) are now re-defined at the loan package level. In particular, Total PBR Share is defined as the 
amount of loan taken by all the participants with a borrower relationship in the loan, divided by 
the total amount of the loan. Total PLR Share is defined as the amount of loan taken by all the 
participants with a lead arranger relationship in the loan, divided by the total amount of the loan. 
The other control variables are defined as above.18                                                                                               
Finally, to test my hypothesis on the effect of participant-borrower relationship and 
participant-lead arranger relationship on the cost of debt (H6), I employ the following OLS 
regression at the loan facility level with industry and year fixed effects: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐵𝑅 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝐿𝑅 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
𝛽5 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽6 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽8𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 +
𝛽10 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽11 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 +
𝛽12 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽13 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽14 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 +
𝛽15 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀.   (4) 
                                                 
16 The higher the Herfindahl Index, the higher the concentration of the loan. For example, in the extreme cases of 
loans with only one lender, Herfindahl Index takes the value of 10,000 (=100*100). 
17 Similar to Sufi (2007), I perform the test at the package level rather than at the facility level. Since lenders’ share 
allocation is the same across different facilities within the same loan package, facility-level observations would not 
be independent, causing standard errors to be understated and boosting significance levels. As a result, I do not 
include control variables that vary across facilities within the same loan, such as loan spread and other loan terms.  
18 Compared to Equation (3), Equation (4) does not control for Lead Arranger Share (since it is a measure of loan 
syndicate structure, and thus one of the dependent variables) and for the participant-level variables, since the 
analysis is at the package-level.  
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This analysis is performed at the facility level because there can be multiple loan facilities in 
a loan package depending on the facility type (e.g., term loan facility and revolver loan facility) 
and the facility purpose (e.g., working capital purpose and debt repayment purpose), and thus each 
facility has its own loan terms, such as spread, maturity, security and so on. Cost of debt is 
measured by Loan Spread and Upfront Fee. The first dependent variable, Loan Spread, is defined 
as the amount a borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down including 
any annual fees. The second dependent variable, Upfront Fee, is defined as the one-time fee paid 
by the borrower to lenders at loan initiation. Following prior literature, in addition to the other 
variables in Equation (3), I include a series of facility-level control variables that potentially affect 
cost of debt (e.g., Ivashina 2009). In particular, Loan Maturity is defined as the number of months 
a facility will be active from signing date to expiration date. Secured Loan is defined as an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if a facility is secured and 0 otherwise. Facility Size is defined as the actual 
amount of the facility in millions committed by the facility's lender pool.  
4. Empirical Analyses 
4.1. Summary Statistics 
In Table 1 Panel B, I report summary statistics of my key variables. To address concerns 
with outliers, I winsorize the variables at 1% and 99% levels. There are 61,373 participants (3,010 
unique participants) in 5,989 loan packages. The primary dependent variable is Participant Share. 
On average, a participant takes 6.8% of the loan package, which is about 1/3 of the average lead 
arranger’s share (21.1%). As for the participant-level variables of interest, PBR has a mean value 
of 0.41, while PLR has a mean value of 0.84. That is, on average, 41% of all participants have lent 
to the borrower before, while 84% of all participants have joined a lead arranger’s syndicate before.  
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The participant-level control variables indicate that 35% of the loans are made to borrowers 
within the top 5 industries that the participant has lent to in the past 3 years (Industry Exposure). 
80% of the participants are commercial banks (Lender Type=1). For the borrower-level control 
variables, there are 2,314 borrowers for 5,989 packages. On average borrowers have total assets 
of $4,559.34 million, a profitability ratio of 0.03, a leverage ratio of 0.26 and a tangibility ratio of 
0.37. 47% of the borrowers have recent S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating available 
(Credit Rating Availability).  
For the package-level variables, the mean Lead Arranger Share is 21.1% of the loan. 37% 
of the packages have at least one Repeat Lead Arranger, while 45% of the packages have at least 
one Large Lead Arranger. The average Number of Lead Arrangers and Number of Participants, 
are, respectively, 1.58, and 10.25 per loan package.  Participants with a borrower relationship on 
average take 28% of the loan as a group (Total PBR Share), while participants with a lead arranger 
relationship on average take 57% of the loan as a group (Total PLR Share). As for the facility-
level variables, a loan facility on average has a loan spread of 146 basis points, an upfront fee of 
43 basis points, matures in 45 months, is secured 42% of the times, and amounts to $501 million. 
There are 7,688 facilities for 5,989 packages, in which 1,964 facilities have available the upfront 
fee information. 
In Table 1 Panel C, I list names of the top 5 participants in terms of PBR and PLR intensity. 
Bank of New York is the most PBR-intensive participant lender, averaging 1.41 transactions with 
the borrower within the prior 5 years for each loan Bank of New York participated in, with the 
other top 4 participants ranging between 1.25 and 1.38 transactions. US Bank is the most PLR-
intensive participant lender, averaging 191 transactions with the lead arranger within the prior 5 
years, with the other top 4 participants ranging from 103 to 145 transactions. Notably, the top 5 
28 
 
participants engaging in relationship lending (PBR or PLR) do not overlap much with the top lead 
arranger lenders. The top 5 lead arrangers in terms of 2012 US market share are: JP Morgan 
(18.28%), Bank of America Merrill Lynch (16.07%), Citi (9.86%), Wells Fargo (9.45%) and 
Barclays (5.51%) (Source: Bloomberg). Lead arrangers tend to be larger than participant lenders, 
with lead arrangers having an average asset size about eight times larger than participant lenders 
(Altunbaş and Kara (2011).   
4.2. The Effect of PBR and PLR on Participants’ Share in the Loan 
Table 2 analyzes the effect of PBR and PLR on a participant’s share in the loan. In a 
specification using package fixed effects (Column 1), I find that a participant with a borrower 
relationship (PBR) on average takes a 0.74% larger share, while a participant with a lead arranger 
relationship (PLR) on average takes a 0.95% larger share. These figures represent, respectively, 
an 11% and a 14% increase relative to the mean participant share of 6.83%. The results are 
consistent with my prediction in H1. As for the participant-level control variables, the positive 
coefficient on Lender Type indicates that being a traditional commercial bank increases the share 
taken by participants. The coefficient on Industry Exposure is positive but not significant, perhaps 
as a result of the offsetting pressure to lend to familiar sectors and diversify risks.  
Next, I re-estimate the same OLS regression including borrower fixed effects to allow for 
the inclusion of borrower-level and package-level control variables and thus also prepare for the 
subsequent cross-sectional analyses. As shown in Column 2, the results are generally similar. A 
participant with PBR (PLR) on average takes a 0.67% (0.63%) larger share, a 10% (9%) increase 




As for the borrower-level control variables, some of the coefficients may seem at odds with 
intuition. For example, we would expect a positive, rather than negative coefficient of Borrower 
Size (a proxy for information opacity). However, as mentioned in Section 3, because of the 
inclusion of borrower fixed effects, these coefficients need to be interpreted with caution, since 
participants within the same package face the same borrower characteristics.19  To ensure that 
borrower-level control variables behave as expected, I replicate in my sample prior literature’s 
result that participants as a group hold more when borrowers are less informationally opaque and 
when lead arrangers are relationship lenders with the borrower (e.g., Sufi 2007). To do so, I use 
participants’ total share as my dependent variable and confirm that it is positively related to 
borrower size/profitability/credit rating availability (see Appendix B). 
4.2.1. Robustness Tests 
To ensure the robustness of my primary result in Table 2 (the positive association between 
PBR/PLR and participant share), I perform several robustness checks (see Appendix C-E). First, I 
make sure that my result is not sensitive to the use of a 5-year window to define relationship loans, 
i.e., the PBR and PLR variables. The results are similar when (i) PBR is defined as equal to 1 if 
the participant has lent to the borrower in the past and the loan is still outstanding, and 0 otherwise; 
and (ii) PLR is equal to 1 if the participant has joined a lead arranger’s syndicate loan with any 
borrower in the past and that loan is still outstanding, and 0 otherwise. Second, I make sure that 
my results are not driven by cases where a participant has both lead arranger relationship and 
borrower relationship in the same loan. I re-run the test in Table 2, Column 2, adding an interaction 
term for PBR*PLR and confirm that the main effect on PBR and PLR remain significant and of 
                                                 
19 In other words, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as evidence of how cross-sectional differences in firm 
characteristics among borrowers affect participants’ individual share decisions. Instead, the coefficients reflect the 
effect of changing firm characteristics from one package to the other within the same firm, among firms with 
multiple packages.  
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similar magnitude (respectively, equal to 0.71 and 0.64, both significant at 1% level), while the 
interaction coefficient is insignificant. Third, I replace PBR and PLR with corresponding variables 
capturing the intensity of the relationship, with PBR Intensity equal to the number of the 
participant’s transactions with the borrower within the prior 5 years, and PLR Intensity equal to 
the number of the participant’s transactions with the lead arranger (in any borrower) within the 
prior 5 years. For participants with a borrower relationship, the mean PBR Intensity is 1.85 (with 
an interquartile range from 1 to 2 and a maximum of 10) and mean PLR Intensity is 60 (interquartile 
range between 6 and 72). Both the coefficient of PBR Intensity and PLR Intensity are positive and 
significant (respectively, equal to 0.28 and 0.003, both significant at 1% level), suggesting that the 
intensity of the relationship, not just its presence, matters.   
Next, I re-run the test in Table 2 for the subset of 4,637 loans (out of the total sample of 
5,989) with a single facility, so as to be able to introduce a series of facility-level variables: loan 
spread, loan maturity, secured loan, facility size (see Table 1, Panel B).20  I continue to find positive 
and significant coefficients on PBR and PLR (respectively, equal to 0.60 and 0.69, both significant 
at 1% level, Appendix F). 
Finally, my interpretation of Table 2 is based on the assumption that the participation choice 
of participants with PBR or PLR is exogenous, after controlling for borrower characteristics, 
participant characteristics, lead arranger characteristics, loan characteristics, borrower fixed effects 
and year fixed effects.  However, this assumption may not be valid if some unobserved omitted 
variables affect both the incidence of PBR and PLR, as well as participants’ share.  First, to rule 
out the alternative explanation that participants prefer to continue their relationship only with 
borrowers who have better prior loan performances, and that they also take a larger share in those 
                                                 
20 See footnote 17 for a discussion of the problem of running the tests at the facility-level. 
31 
 
borrowers’ subsequent loans, I split the sample based on prior loan performance (measured by 
covenant violations). I find that for loan deals with covenant violations within 5 years of loan 
initiation, the ratio of participants with PBR or PLR is not significantly lower than loan deals 
without covenant violations.21 Second, to further address the endogeneity problem, I adopt the 
Propensity Score Methodology (PSM) as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). My first PSM robustness 
test is for PBR. Specifically, for each test loan deal that a lender takes and has a borrower relationship 
(i.e., a loan deal with PBR=1), I identify a matched loan deal that the same lender takes and has no 
borrower relationship (i.e., a loan deal with PBR=0), but is in every other way similar to the test loan 
deal (i.e., has the closest propensity score). My second PSM robustness test is for PLR. Similarly, for 
each test loan deal that a lender takes and has a lead arranger relationship (i.e., a loan deal with PLR=1), 
I identify a matched loan deal that the same lender takes and has no lead arranger relationship (i.e., a 
loan deal with PLR=0) but is in every other way similar to the test loan deal. 22 In Appendix G for the 
PSM robustness test, I confirm the effect of PBR on participants’ share-taking decisions after PSM is 
similar in terms of magnitude and significance level as in Table 2 (after PSM, the coefficient on PBR 
is equal to 0.723, significant at 1%). I am also able to confirm the effect of PLR (after PSM, the 
coefficient on PLR is equal to 0.501, significant at 1%).   
4.2.2. Cross-sectional Determinants: Borrower Characteristics  
In Table 3, I begin to explore how the effect of PBR and PLR on participants’ share in the 
loan (the key result in Table 2) varies with a number of cross-sectional determinants, starting with 
                                                 
21 Specifically, the ratio of participants with PBR in loan deals with (without) prior covenant violations = 0.415 
(0.414), with a t-stat for the difference=-0.19.  In the case of PLR, the ratio of participants with PLR in loan deals 
with (without) prior covenant violations = 0.801 (0.847), with a t-stat for the difference= 6.56.  Although the 
difference is statistically significant, it’s not economically significant.   
22 The propensity score is calculated based on the coefficient estimates from the following logit models:  
𝑃𝐵𝑅 (𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 2, 𝑃𝐿𝑅) = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐿𝑅(𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 2, 𝑃𝐵𝑅) + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽8 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽9 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
𝛽10 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝛽11 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽12 𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 +
𝛽13 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽14 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀. 
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borrowers’ characteristics. First, in Panel A, I examine borrowers’ information opacity. As noted 
in H2.1, I predict that the effect of PBR on participants’ share is stronger for opaque borrowers, 
because for these borrowers, PBR is more useful in mitigating information asymmetry, allowing 
the participants to take a larger share. I separately examine three proxies for (higher) borrower 
information opacity: Small Borrower, No Credit Rating and Low Analyst Following. Small 
Borrower is an indicator variable equal to 1 if borrower size is below the sample median, and 0 
otherwise. No Credit Rating is an indicator variable equal to 1 if S&P domestic long-term issuer 
credit rating is not available for the firm, and 0 otherwise. Low Analyst Following is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the number of analyst forecasts of the borrower’s annual earnings per share 
the year before loan origination is below sample median, and 0 otherwise. I include these variables 
as the main effect and interact them with PBR and PLR.23 My focus is on the interaction terms. 
Across Columns 1-3, consistent with H2.1, I find that the effect of PBR on participants’ share 
is more pronounced for opaque borrowers. In particular, as shown in Column 1, while PBR 
increases participants’ share in the loan by 0.57% for large borrowers (an 8% increase relative to 
the mean participant share of 6.83%), the increase is significantly larger, by 63%, for small 
borrowers (the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.36%, compared with the main effect of 
0.57%). Similarly, in Column 2, I find that the effect of PBR on the participant’s share is more 
pronounced for borrowers with no credit rating. While PBR increases participants’ share in the 
loan by 0.61% for borrowers with a credit rating, the increase is significantly larger, by 35%, for 
borrowers with no credit rating. Finally, in Column 3, I find that the effect of PBR is more 
pronounced for borrowers with low analyst following. While PBR increases participants’ share in 
                                                 
23 When I include Small Borrower, I no longer include Borrower Size among the other control variables. 
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the loan by 0.61% for borrowers with the high analyst following, the increase is significantly, 
larger, by 30%, for borrowers with the low analyst following.  
In contrast, the association between PLR and participants’ share does not differ between 
large and small borrowers, or between borrowers with the low and high analyst following, and is 
actually lower for borrowers with no credit rating, suggesting that, overall, borrowers’ information 
opacity does not enhance the effect of PLR on participants’ share in the loan.  
Second, as noted in H2.2, I predict that the effect of PBR on participants’ share is stronger 
for borrowers that are less conservative. In Panel B, I examine accounting conservatism using the 
firm-year conservatism score in Khan and Watts (2009). Less Conservative Borrower is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower’s conservatism score is below the sample median, and 
0 otherwise. Consistent with H2.2, I find that the effect of PBR on participants’ share is more 
pronounced for less conservative borrowers. In particular, while PBR increases participants’ share 
in the loan by 0.58% for conservative borrowers (an 8% increase relative to the mean participant 
share of 6.83%), the increase is significantly larger, by 28%, for less conservative borrowers (the 
coefficient on the interaction term is 0.16%, compared with the main effect of 0.58%). In contrast, 
the association between PLR and participants’ share does not differ for different levels of 
accounting conservatism, suggesting that, borrower accounting conservatism does not impact 
PLR’s effect on participants’ share in the loan.  
Third, as predicted in H2.3, I expect that the effect of PLR on participants’ share is stronger 
for borrowers with past accounting irregularities. In Panel C, Column 1, I examine accounting 
irregularities using AAER data obtained from the Berkeley Center for Financial Reporting and 
Management. AAER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC issued any Accounting and Audit 
Enforcement Releases for the borrower within 5 years prior to loan initiation. In Column 2, I 
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examine material restatements from Audit Analytics. Restatement is an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the borrower has restated the financial statements within 5 years prior to loan initiation, and 0 
otherwise. Consistent with H2.3, I find that the effect of PLR on participants’ share is more 
pronounced for borrowers with accounting irregularities. In particular, in Column 1, while PLR 
increases participants’ share in the loan by 0.61% for borrowers without AAER (a 9% increase 
relative to the mean participant share of 6.83%), the increase is significantly larger, by 118%, for 
borrowers with AAER (the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.72%, compared with the main 
effect of 0.61%). In Column 2, while PLR increases participants’ share in the loan by 0.59% for 
borrowers without Restatement (a 9% increase relative to the mean participant share of 6.83%), 
the increase is significantly larger, by 86%, for borrowers with Restatement (the coefficient on the 
interaction term is 0.51%, compared with the main effect of 0.59%). In contrast, the association 
between PBR and participants’ share does not differ for borrowers with accounting irregularities.  
Fourth, as predicted in H2.4, I expect that the effect of PLR on participants’ share is stronger 
for borrowers with past covenant violations. In Panel D, I examine covenant violation data 
obtained from Amir Sufi’s website following Nini et al. (2012). Covenant Violation is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the borrower has violated a loan covenant within 5 years prior to loan 
initiation and 0 otherwise. Consistent with H2.4, I find that the effect of PLR on participants’ share 
is more pronounced for borrowers with covenant violations. In particular, in Column 1, while PLR 
increases participants’ share in the loan by 0.6% for borrowers without Covenant Violation (a 9% 
increase relative to the mean participant share of 6.83%), the increase is significantly larger, by 
105%, for borrowers with Covenant Violation (the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.63%, 
compared with the main effect of 0.6%). In contrast, the association between PBR and participants’ 
share is not affected by past covenant violations.  
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4.2.3. Cross-Sectional Determinants: Lead Arranger Characteristics 
Next, in Table 4, I examine how lead arrangers’ characteristics influence the effect of PLR 
on participants’ share. For this purpose, I examine two characteristics, Repeat Lead Arranger and 
Large Lead Arranger (defined as in Table 2) and include them in the regression both as main 
effects and as interaction terms with PBR and PLR.   
I find that lead arrangers’ characteristics have a strong impact on the association between 
PLR and participants’ share. In particular, as predicted in H3, the effect of PLR on participants’ 
share in the loan is higher in presence of a repeat lead arranger or a large lead arranger. As shown 
in Column 1, while PLR increases participants’ share in the loan by 0.51% for loans with no repeat 
lead arranger, the increase is significantly larger, by 67%, for loans with a repeat lead arranger. 
Similarly, in Column 2, while PLR increases participants’ share in the loan by 0.51% for loans 
with no large lead arranger, the increase is significantly larger, by 70%, for loans with a large lead 
arranger.  
As for PBR, the interaction terms with Repeat Large Arranger is positive and significant, 
whereas the interaction term with Large Lead Arranger is not significant, providing only some 
evidence that lead arranger’s characteristics influence the effect of PBR on participants’ share.  
4.2.4. Cross-Sectional Determinants: Participant Characteristics 
Finally, in Table 5, I investigate the effect of participants’ characteristics on the relationship 
between participant-level relationship lending (as proxied by PBR and PLR) and participants’ 
share. In particular, I focus on two proxies for participants’ information acquisition capacity limits: 
Small Participant Bank, an indicator variable equal to 1 if total assets of the participant bank are 
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below sample median, and 0 otherwise; and Faster Loan Growth Bank, an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if loan growth rate of the participant bank is above sample median, and 0 otherwise.24   
I find that while PLR does not increase participants’ share for large participant banks, it 
increases participants’ share for small participant banks, and the difference (as captured by the 
interaction term) is statistically significant (Column 1). Similarly, in Column 2, while PLR 
increases participants’ share in the loan by 0.68% for a slower loan growth participant bank, the 
increase is significantly larger, by 103%, for a faster loan growth participant bank.  
Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that when participants have information 
acquisition capacity limits, the effect of PLR on participants’ share is more pronounced, consistent 
with the prediction in H5. In contrast, the effect of PBR on participants’ share is not significantly 
different between small and larger participant banks, or between faster and slower loan growth 
participant banks.  
4.3. Loan Syndicate Structure 
The previous analyses focus on individual participants’ share decisions, that is, at the 
package-participant level. My next analyses examine the effect of participant-level relationship 
lending (PBR and PLR) on the loan syndicate structure at the package level.  
In particular, in Table 6, I analyze how Total PBR Share and Total PLR Share for a loan 
package impact two measures of loan syndicate structure: Lead Arranger Share and loan 
concentration index (Herfindahl Index). 25  In H5, I predict that participant-level relationship 
lending will reduce the need for a larger lead arranger’s share or for greater loan concentration. 
                                                 
24 The sample observations drop to 11,329 and 11,294 because this table requires participant financial information 
from Bank Compustat. 
25 These measures are commonly used in studies on loan syndicate structure (e.g., Sufi 2007). In my setting, a 
benefit of examining the Herfindahl Index is that it suffers less from a potential mechanical relationship between 
participants’ share and lead arrangers’ share. 
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Consistent with my hypothesis, I find a negative association between both Total PBR Share and 
Total PLR Share and the two variables of interest. In particular, one standard deviation increase in 
Total PBR Share decreases Lead Arranger Share by 0.75% (=0.028*26.87) while one standard 
deviation increase in Total PLR Share decreases Lead Arranger Share by 4.8% (=0.172*27.91). 
As for the Herfindahl Index (Column 2), one standard deviation increase in Total PBR Share 
decreases Herfindahl Index by 55 (=2.05*26.87), while one standard deviation increase in Total 
PLR Share decreases Herfindahl Index by 418.4 (=14.99*27.91). The stronger effect of Total PLR 
Share may be viewed as evidence that participants’ relationships with lead arrangers play a 
stronger role in mitigating information asymmetry problems.  
4.4. Cost of Debt 
          In Table 7, I test H6 by examining whether participant-level relationship lending (PBR and 
PLR) reduces demand for information asymmetry compensation, as proxied by Loan Spread, and 
reduces syndication cost and syndication risk, as proxied by Upfront Fee. My first dependent 
variable is Loan Spread, measured as the amount a borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for 
each dollar drawn down including any annual fees. Consistent with my prediction, I find a negative 
association between participant-level relationship lending (Total PBR Share and Total PLR Share) 
and the loan spread. In particular, one standard deviation increase in Total PBR Share decreases 
Loan Spread by 1.7 (=0.065*26.87) basis points, and one standard deviation increase in Total PLR 
Share decreases Loan Spread by 17.3 (=0.619*27.91) basis points. To assess the economic 
magnitude of these effects, consider that the average syndicated loan in my sample has a loan 
spread of 146 basis points. Also, prior studies document that a lead arranger relationship with the 
borrower is associated with a decrease of 10 to 17 basis points in the loan spread (Bharath et al. 
2011). Similar to Table 6, the stronger effect of Total PLR Share may suggest that participants’ 
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relationships with lead arrangers play a stronger role in mitigating information asymmetry 
problems.  
My second dependent variable is Upfront Fee, measured as the one-time fee paid by the 
borrower to lenders at loan initiation. Consistent with my prediction, for the 1,964 facilities with 
available upfront fee information, I find a negative association between participant-lead arranger 
relationship (Total PLR Share) and upfront fee. In particular, one standard deviation increase in 
Total PLR Share decreases Upfront Fee by 5.8 (=0.209*27.91) basis points, a 14% increase 
compared with the average upfront fee.  However, Total PBR Share has no effect on Upfront Fee.  
This test suggests that PLR plays a more important role in decreasing loan syndication cost and 
loan syndication risk.  
4.5. Incomplete Contracting 
Finally, in Table 8, I provide exploratory analyses on how participant-level relationship 
lending impacts incomplete debt contracting.  Incomplete debt contracting refers to the situation 
in which lenders worry about future realizations and cannot contract ex-ante for each future state. 
So they use renegotiation, performance pricing and other contracting features to help them allocate 
control rights and better contract for uncertainty in the future (Christensen et al. 2015).   
I identify renegotiations using Dealscan loan amendment data, which include syndicated 
loan renegotiations that require a lender majority vote (Nikolaev 2013). There are loan 
renegotiations in 1139 of the 5989 packages in my sample. I create an indicator variable called 
Renegotiation to identify these cases and use it as a dependent variable. In Column 1, using a logit 
regression, I find a positive significant coefficient on Total PLR share. That is, a loan package 
with more influence of PLR participants is more likely to be renegotiated, consistent with PLR 
39 
 
lowering renegotiation costs (assuming that the ex-post deal amendment is a proxy for the ex-ante 
difficulty in obtaining a lender majority vote).  
Next, I use Dealscan performance pricing data to identify (i) interest-increase-only 
performance pricing and (ii) interest-decrease-only performance pricing. Following Asquith et al. 
(2005), interest-increase-only performance pricing captures concerns with the moral hazard 
problem, because lenders who suffer from the moral hazard problem want to retain the right to 
increase the interest if lead arrangers or borrowers shirk. Interest-decrease-only performance 
pricing captures concerns with the adverse selection problem, because lenders who suffer from 
adverse selection problem and require a higher loan spread, may give the borrower a chance to 
reduce the loan spread ex-post. In my sample, 5056 of the 7688 facilities have performance pricing 
data available. Of this subset, in 27.5% of the cases, the performance pricing grids have the interest 
increasing only pricing grid (a proxy for high concern with moral hazard), while 9.5% have the 
interest decreasing only pricing grid (a proxy for high concern with adverse selection). To identify 
these cases, I create two indicator variables, respectively, Interest Increasing PP and Interest 
Decreasing PP, which I use as dependent variables. In Column 2, using a logit regression, I find a 
positive significant coefficient on Total PBR Share, suggesting that participants with a borrower 
relationship cannot mitigate moral hazard because they do not know the lead arranger well. The 
negative significant coefficient on Total PLR Share indicates that participants with a lead arranger 
relationship can better mitigate moral hazard, because they know the lead arranger’s monitoring 
ability.  
In Column 3, the negative significant coefficient on Total PBR Share indicates that 
participants with a borrower relationship can better mitigate adverse selection, because they know 
the borrower well. The insignificant coefficient on Total PLR Share suggests that participants with 
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a lead arranger relationship cannot really mitigate adverse selection, because they have less 
information about the borrower. 
Overall, I interpret the performance pricing result as preliminary evidence that PLR helps 
to reduce moral hazard in terms of the effort in lead arrangers’ monitoring and due diligence, while 
PBR helps to mitigate the signaling problem with respect to adverse selection. 
5. Conclusion  
As prior literature extensively examines relationship lead arrangers in syndicated loans, 
recent studies begin to look at the role of relationship participants. I provide novel evidence on 
how participants’ relationships with firms and lead arrangers impact the participants’ share in the 
loan. Specifically, I find that participants with a borrower relationship take, on average, a 10% 
larger share, while participants with a lead arranger relationship take, on average, a 9% larger share. 
Furthermore, I identify the economic factors associated with the greater importance of PBR and 
PLR. Specifically, when borrower information is opaque or when the borrower is less conservative, 
the effect of PBR is more pronounced. In contrast, when the borrower has prior accounting 
irregularities or covenant violations, when the lead arranger is a repeat lender or a large lender, 
and when participants have information acquisition capacity limits, the effect of PLR is more 
pronounced. Additional analyses show that loans with a larger share taken by relationship 
participants are associated with a smaller lead arranger share, a less concentrated loan syndicate, 
a lower cost of debt and a lower cost of incomplete contracting.  
My paper contributes to the interaction of relationship lending and syndicated lending 
literature. My initial evidence on the role of PBR and PLR in syndicated lending opens up 
additional questions. For example, do institutional relationship participants profit more in stock 
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 Table 1: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents the sample selection process and descriptive statistics. Variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Step   Loan packages 
Compustat U.S. non-financial firms from 1990 to 2012  41,309 
Lead arranger and participant information   25,678 
At least one loan in prior 5 years for the same borrower  18,783 
Loan share and loan spread information   6,643 
Borrower-level variables information   5,989 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
       Distribution 
Variables N Mean SD P10 P50 P90 
Primary Dependent Variable 
Participant Share  61,373 6.83 6.24 1.61 5 13.89 
Variables of Interest 
PBR 61,373 0.41 0.49 0 0 1 
PLR 61,373 0.84 0.36 0 1 1 
Participant-Level Variables       
Industry Exposure 61,373 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
Lender Type 61,373 0.8 0.4 0 1 1 
Borrower-Level Variables       
Borrower Size26  2,314 4,559.34 12,314.79 156.95 873.97 10,604.59 
Profitability 2,314 0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.11 
Leverage 2,314 0.26 0.19 0.02 0.24 0.51 
Tangibility 2,314 0.37 0.25 0.08 0.31 0.76 
Credit Rating Availability 2,314 0.47 0.5 0 0 1 
Package-Level Variables 
Lead Arranger Share 5,989 21.1 14.91 6.67 16.25 48 
Repeat Lead Arranger 5,989 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 
Large Lead Arranger 5,989 0.45 0.5 0 0 1 
Number of Lead Arrangers 5,989 1.58 1.53 1 1 2 
Number of Participants 5,989 10.25 9.05 2 8 22 
Total PBR Share 5,989 28.17 26.87 0 24.16 67.29 
Total PLR Share 5,989 56.82 27.91 6.92 64.09 86.85 
Facility-Level Variables 
Loan Spread 7,688 146.04 106.51 30 125 300 
Upfront Fee 1,964 42.67 50.10 7.5 25 100 
Loan maturity 7,688 45.16 22.15 12 48 69 
Secured Loan 7,688 0.42 0.49 0 0 1 
                                                 
26 Unlogged value in millions  
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Facility Size 7,688 501.04 1,010.56 36 200 1,100 
 
Panel C: Top 5 Relationship Intensive Participants 
 
Top 5 Borrower Relationship Intensive Participants 
Average Number of Prior Loans 
with the Same Borrower  
Bank of New York 1.41 
Societe Generale  1.38 
Mellon Bank 1.34 
Barclays Bank Plc 1.30 
Bank of Nova Scotia 1.25 
 
Top 5 Lead Arranger Relationship Intensive Participants 
Average Number of Prior Loans 
with the Same Lead Arranger  
US Bank 191 
Bank of New York 145 
SunTrust Bank 124 
BNP Paribas  114 




Table 2: The Effect of PBR and PLR on Participants’ Share in the Loan 
 
This table analyzes the effect of PBR and PLR on a participant’s share in the loan. The dependent variable is 
Participant Share. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 






Dependent Variable:  
Participant Share 
    
PBR 0.739*** 0.668*** 
 (0.039) (0.047) 
PLR 0.951*** 0.633*** 
 (0.064) (0.081) 
Industry Exposure 0.043 0.073 
 (0.048) (0.057) 
Lender Type 0.096** 0.098* 
 (0.049) (0.059) 
Borrower Size  -0.395*** 
  (0.149) 
Profitability  -1.722* 
  (0.956) 
Leverage  -0.691 
  (0.558) 
Tangibility  1.488** 
  (0.743) 
Credit Rating Availability  -0.538*** 
  (0.153) 
Lead Arranger Share  0.108*** 
  (0.012) 
Repeat Lead Arranger  -0.071 
  (0.088) 
Large Lead Arranger  -0.427*** 
  (0.111) 
Number of Lead Arrangers  -0.966*** 
  (0.102) 
Number of Participants  -0.180*** 
  (0.018) 
Constant 4.201*** 14.416*** 
 (0.467) (1.238) 
   
Package Fixed Effect Yes No 
Borrower Fixed Effect No Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Observations 61,373 61,373 





Table 3: Borrower Characteristics and the Effect of PBR and PLR on Participants’ Share 
in the Loan 
 
This table examines how borrower characteristics influences the effect of PBR and PLR on participants’ share in the 
loan. Panel A examines borrower information opacity. Column 1 presents the analyses based on borrower size, 
where Small Borrower is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower size is below sample median, and 0 
otherwise. Column 2 presents the analyses based on credit rating availability, where No Credit Rating is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating is not available for the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Column 3 presents the analyses based on analyst following intensity, where Low Analyst Following is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the number of analyst forecasts on borrowers’ annual earnings per share the year before loan 
origination is below sample median, and 0 otherwise. Panel B examines borrowers’ accounting conservatism, where 
Less Conservative Borrower is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower’s conservatism score constructed 
following Khan and Watts (2009) is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Panel C examines borrowers’ 
accounting irregularities. In Column 1, AAER is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC issued any Accounting 
and Audit Enforcement Releases for the borrower within 5 years prior to loan initiation, and 0 otherwise. In Column 
2, Restatement is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower has restated the financial statements within 5 years 
prior to loan initiation, and 0 otherwise. Panel D examines borrowers’ past loan performances by covenant 
violations. Covenant Violation is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower has violated at least one loan 
covenant within 5 years prior to loan initiation, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 











PBR 0.567*** 0.612*** 0.605*** 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.054) 
PLR 0.714*** 0.767*** 0.653*** 
 (0.099) (0.095) (0.109) 
PBR* Opaque Borrower 0.359*** 0.216* 0.183* 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.099) 
PLR*Opaque Borrower -0.180 -0.374** -0.046 
 (0.175) (0.185) (0.166) 
Opaque Borrower 0.426* 0.761*** -0.045 
 (0.256) (0.220) (0.229) 
Participant, Borrower and Package Level Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effect  







Observations 61,373 61,373 61,373 














PBR* Less Conservative Borrower 0.159** 
 (0.073) 
PLR* Less Conservative Borrower -0.114 
 (0.123) 
Less Conservative Borrower 0.568*** 
 (0.157) 
Participant, Borrower and Package Level Controls Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effect  












 AAER Restatement 
PBR 0.664*** 0.664*** 
 (0.036) (0.037) 
PLR 0.611*** 0.589*** 
 (0.061) (0.062) 
PBR* Borrower with Accounting Irregularity -0.194 -0.085 
 (0.153) (0.110) 
PLR* Borrower with Accounting Irregularity 0.717** 0.506** 
 (0.316) (0.226) 
Borrower with Accounting Irregularity -1.27*** -0.286 
 (0.334) (0.230) 
Participant, Borrower and Package Level Controls Yes Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effect  





Observations 61,373 61,373 
R-squared 0.666 0.666 
 
  
                                                 
27 The observation is lower than 61,373 because conservatism score requires the availability of an additional firm 
variable (Market-to-Book Ratio). 
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PBR* Covenant Violation 0.088 
 (0.194) 
PLR* Covenant Violation 0.631** 
 (0.311) 
Covenant Violation -0.072 
 (0.327) 
Participant, Borrower and Package Level Controls Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effect  



































Table 4: Lead Arranger Characteristics and the Effect of PBR and PLR on Participants’ 
Share in the Loan 
 
This table investigates how lead arranger characteristics influence the effect of PBR and PLR on participants’ share 
in the loan. Column 1 presents the analyses based on Repeat Lead Arranger. Column 2 presents the analyses based 
on Large Lead Arranger. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors reported in parentheses are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 











PBR 0.529*** 0.683*** 
 (0.069) (0.075) 
PLR 0.509*** 0.513*** 
 (0.111) (0.108) 
PBR* Lead Arranger Characteristics 0.277*** -0.030 
 (0.093) (0.092) 
PLR* Lead Arranger Characteristics 0.345* 0.359** 
 (0.185) (0.164) 
Lead Arranger Characteristics -0.502** -0.728*** 
 (0.207) (0.203) 
Participant, Borrower and Package Level Controls Yes Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effect  





Observations 61,373 61,373 


















Table 5: Participant Characteristics and the Effect of PBR and PLR on Participants’ Share 
in the Loan 
 
This table analyzes how participant bank characteristics influence the effect of PBR and PLR on participants’ share 
in the loan. Column 1 presents the analyses based on participant bank size, where Small Participant Bank is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if total assets of the participant bank is below sample median, and 0 otherwise. Column 
2 presents the analyses based on the participant bank’s loan growth rate, where Faster Loan Growth Bank is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if loan growth rate of the participant bank is above sample median, and 0 otherwise. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 




Faster Loan Growth 
Bank 
PBR 0.737*** 0.718*** 
 (0.090) (0.102) 
PLR 0.249 0.680*** 
 (0.277) (0.243) 
PBR* Participant Characteristics -0.074 0.116 
 (0.165) (0.146) 
PLR* Participant Characteristics 1.019*** 0.703** 
 (0.322) (0.306) 
Participant Characteristics -2.227*** -0.652** 
 (0.312) (0.301) 
Participant, Borrower and Package Level Controls Yes Yes 
Borrower Fixed Effect  





Observations 11,329 11,294 





Table 6: The Effect of PBR and PLR on Loan Syndicate Structure 
 
This table analyzes how Total PBR Share and Total PLR Share for a loan package impact lead arrangers’ share and 
loan concentration index (Herfindahl Index). Standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, 





Lead Arranger Share Herfindahl Index 
Total PBR Share  -0.028*** -2.052*** 
 (0.008) (0.609) 
Total PLR Share -0.172*** -14.990*** 
 (0.014) (1.229) 
Borrower Size -1.775*** -140.093*** 
 (0.257) (23.414) 
Profitability -6.906*** -1,121.23*** 
 (2.361) (202.275) 
Leverage -2.157* -163.379 
 (1.170) (103.883) 
Tangibility -1.601 -148.276 
 (1.188) (111.577) 
Credit Rating Availability -0.983** -77.753** 
 (0.483) (35.460) 
Repeat Lead Arranger 0.403 0.021 
 (0.332) (26.682) 
Large Lead Arranger 1.551*** 122.503*** 
 (0.342) (28.130) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -1.977*** -148.284*** 
 (0.184) (14.658) 
Number of Participants -0.520*** -52.209*** 
 (0.054) (4.765) 
Constant 54.166*** 4,591.570*** 
 (2.092) (210.312) 
Industry Fixed Effect  





Observations 5,989 5,989 





Table 7: The Effect of PBR and PLR on Cost of Debt 
 
This table analyzes how Total PBR Share and Total PLR Share impact cost of debt (Loan Spread and Upfront fee). 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
 
 Dependent Variable 
  Loan Spread Upfront Fee 
Total PBR Share  -0.065* -0.019 
 (0.038) (0.045) 
Total PLR Share -0.619*** -0.209*** 
 (0.045) (0.040) 
Borrower Size -18.982*** -0.481 
 (1.016) (1.148) 
Profitability -314.484*** -104.388*** 
 (16.197) (13.911) 
Leverage 80.658*** 1.341 
 (5.821) (6.483) 
Tangibility -27.432*** -0.417 
 (5.572) (6.007) 
Credit Rating Availability 1.560 7.272*** 
 (2.130) (2.493) 
Repeat Lead Arranger -1.242 -1.193 
 (1.854) (2.626) 
Large Lead Arranger  5.680*** -0.995 
 (1.802) (2.073) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -2.000*** -1.202* 
 (0.666) (0.617) 
Number of Participants 0.726*** 0.317*** 
 (0.103) (0.116) 
Loan Maturity -0.161*** 0.030 
 (0.047) (0.047) 
Secured Loan 63.815*** 19.605*** 
 (2.292) (2.266) 
Facility Size -0.002*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 270.587*** 55.310*** 
 (11.039) (11.976) 
Industry Fixed Effect  





Observations 7,688 1,964 





Table 8: The Effect of PBR and PLR on Incomplete Debt Contracting 
 
This table analyzes how Total PBR Share and Total PLR Share impact incomplete debt contracting. In Column 1, 
Renegotiation=1 when there is deal amendment for the loan, and 0 otherwise. In Column 2, Interest Increasing 
PP=1 when there is interest-increasing-only performance pricing for the facility, and 0 otherwise. In Column 3, 
Interest decreasing PP=1 when there is interest-decreasing-only performance pricing for the facility, and 0 
otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 




Total PBR Share  -0.001 0.003* -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Total PLR Share 0.006*** -0.009*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Borrower Size -0.211*** -0.463*** 0.192*** 
 (0.032) (0.045) (0.064) 
Profitability -0.857** -1.521*** 1.427 
 (0.424) (0.575) (0.890) 
Leverage -0.177 0.501** -2.620*** 
 (0.200) (0.219) (0.403) 
Tangibility -0.041 0.259* 0.708*** 
 (0.136) (0.141) (0.216) 
Credit Rating Availability 0.057 0.017 -0.831*** 
 (0.084) (0.093) (0.132) 
Repeat Lead Arranger 0.083 -0.005 0.140 
 (0.079) (0.082) (0.122) 
Large Lead Arranger  -0.157** 0.150* -0.016 
 (0.074) (0.079) (0.116) 
Number of Lead Arrangers 0.035 -0.124** 0.059 
 (0.029) (0.059) (0.039) 
Number of Participants 0.006 0.029*** -0.032*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) 
Loan Spread  0.008*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
Loan Maturity  0.008*** -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
Secured Loan  -0.403*** 1.319*** 
  (0.091) (0.145) 
Facility Size  0.000*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.252 0.944*** -2.360*** 
 (0.194) (0.305) (0.474) 
Observations 5,989 5,056 5,056 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions  
 
Variables Definition 
Primary Dependent Variable  
Participant Share The amount of the loan taken by a participant divided 
by the total amount of the loan (Dealscan). 
Primary Variables of Interest  
PBR An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has 
lent to the borrower within 5 years, and 0 otherwise 
(Dealscan). 
PLR An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has 
joined the lead arranger’s syndicate within 5 years 
for any borrower, and 0 otherwise (Dealscan). 
Participant-Level Variables  
Industry Exposure An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is within 
top 5 industry that the participant has lent to within 
prior 3 years, and 0 otherwise (Dealscan). 
Lender Type An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant is a 
depository institution, and 0 otherwise (Dealscan). 
Borrower-Level Variables 
Borrower Size The natural logarithm of a borrower’s total assets, 
measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year 
before loan origination (Compustat). 
Profitability The ratio of a borrower’s net income before 
extraordinary items to total assets, measured at the 
end of the most recent fiscal year before loan 
origination (Compustat). 
Leverage The ratio of a borrower’s long-term debt to total 
assets, measured at the end of the most recent fiscal 
year before loan origination (Compustat). 
Tangibility The ratio of a borrower’s net PPE to total assets, 
measured at the end of the most recent fiscal year 
before loan origination (Compustat). 
Credit Rating Availability An indicator variable equal to 1 if S&P domestic 
long-term issuer credit rating is available for a 
borrower and 0 otherwise, measured at the end of the 
most recent fiscal month before loan origination 
(Compustat). 
Package-Level Variables   
Lead Arranger Share The amount of loan taken by the lead arranger 
divided by the total amount of the loan, calculated as 
the average percentage of shares if there is more than 
one lead arranger (Dealscan). 
 
Total PBR Share The amount of loan taken by all the participants with 
a borrower relationship in the loan, divided by the 




Total PLR Share The amount of loan taken by all the participants with 
a lead arranger relationship in the loan, divided by 
the total amount of the loan (Dealscan). 
 
Repeat Lead Arranger  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lead arranger 
has lent to the borrower within 5 years, and 0 
otherwise (Dealscan). 
 
Large Lead Arranger  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lead arranger 
is among the top 5 lead arrangers in terms of 
syndicated loan market share the year before loan 
origination, and 0 otherwise (Dealscan). 
 
Number of Lead Arrangers The number of lead arrangers in a loan package 
(Dealscan). 
 
Number of Participants The number of participants in a loan package 
(Dealscan). 
 
Facility-Level Variables  
Loan Spread The amount a borrower pays in basis points over 
LIBOR for each dollar drawn down including any 
annual fees (Dealscan). 
Upfront Fee The one-time fee paid by the borrower to lenders at loan 
initiation (Dealscan). 
Loan Maturity The number of months a facility will be active from 
signing date to expiration date (Dealscan). 
Secured Loan An indicator variable equal to 1 if a facility is secured 
and 0 otherwise (Dealscan). 
Facility Size The actual amount of the facility in millions 



























 Dependent Variable 
 Total Participant share 
  








Credit Rating Availability 0.892* 
 (0.502) 
Lead Arranger Share -0.749 
 (0.496) 
Repeat Lead Arranger 2.426*** 
 (0.380) 
Large Lead Arranger -0.048 
 (0.402) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -5.022*** 
 (0.297) 




Industry Fixed Effect  








Appendix C: The Robustness Test on PBR and PLR Measured by Outstanding Loans 
 
  
 Dependent Variable 
 Participant share 
  
Outstanding PBR 0.609*** 
 (0.049) 
Outstanding PLR 0.603*** 
 (0.077) 
Industry Exposure 0.093 
 (0.057) 
Lender Type 0.117** 
 (0.059) 








Credit Rating Availability -0.538*** 
 (0.152) 
Lead Arranger Share 0.108*** 
 (0.012) 
Repeat Lead Arranger -0.046 
 (0.088) 
Large Lead Arranger -0.424*** 
 (0.112) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -0.966*** 
 (0.102) 




Borrower Fixed Effect  







Appendix D: The Robustness Test on PBR*PLR 
 
  
 Dependent Variable 
 Participant share 
  






Industry Exposure 0.072 
 (0.057) 
Lender Type 0.098* 
 (0.059) 








Credit Rating Availability -0.538*** 
 (0.153) 
Lead Arranger Share 0.108*** 
 (0.012) 
Repeat Lead Arranger -0.071 
 (0.088) 
Large Lead Arranger -0.426*** 
 (0.111) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -0.966*** 
 (0.102) 




Borrower Fixed Effect  







Appendix E: The Robustness Test on Relationship Intensity 
 
  
 Dependent Variable 
 Participant share 
  
PBR Intensity 0.276*** 
 (0.023) 
PLR Intensity 0.003*** 
 (0.000) 
Industry Exposure 0.141** 
 (0.057) 
Lender Type 0.014 
 (0.060) 








Credit Rating Availability -0.524*** 
 (0.153) 
Lead Arranger Share 0.107*** 
 (0.012) 
Repeat Lead Arranger -0.001 
 (0.088) 
Large Lead Arranger -0.495*** 
 (0.114) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -0.970*** 
 (0.102) 




Borrower Fixed Effect  







Appendix F: The Robustness Test on Single Facility Loans 
   Dependent variable 





Industry Exposure 0.094 
 (0.068) 
Lender Type 0.077 
 (0.067) 








Credit Rating Availability -0.501*** 
 (0.186) 
Lead Arranger Share 0.133*** 
 (0.014) 
Repeat Lead Arranger -0.078 
 (0.095) 
Large Lead Arranger -0.299*** 
 (0.113) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -1.215*** 
 (0.125) 
Number of Participants -0.207*** 
 (0.028) 
Loan Maturity -0.012*** 
 (0.004) 
Secured Loan 0.032 
 (0.185) 
Facility Size 0.000* 
 (0.000) 




Borrower Fixed Effect  







Appendix G: PSM Robustness Tests 
 
 
                                                 
28 Since the mean of PLR=0.84, participants have more loans with PLR than without PLR. Therefore, the PSM 
matching process involves duplicate usage of the control sample (PLR=0), and the number of observations (88,826) 
is larger than that in the main regression in Table 2 (61,373). However, I confirm that for a subsample of test loans 
(loans with PLR=1) without duplicate usage of the control loans (loans with PLR=0), the result still holds 
(coefficient on PLR=0.295, significant at 10% level).   
 (1) (2) 
 PSM_PBR PSM_PLR 
   
PBR 0.723*** 0.427*** 
 (0.057) (0.156) 
PLR 0.321** 0.501*** 
 (0.146) (0.147) 
Industry Exposure -0.009 -0.235 
 (0.070) (0.145) 
Lender Type 0.168** 0.062 
 (0.075) (0.136) 
Borrower Size -0.202 0.395 
 (0.146) (0.442) 
Profitability -0.013 -0.304 
 (1.140) (1.852) 
Leverage -0.615 -2.329 
 (0.668) (1.787) 
Tangibility 1.208 0.410 
 (0.862) (1.679) 
Credit Rating Availability -0.452** -0.240 
 (0.181) (0.281) 
Lead Arranger Share 0.123*** 0.132*** 
 (0.013) (0.037) 
Repeat Lead Arranger -0.081 0.066 
 (0.086) (0.227) 
Large Lead Arranger -0.257** -0.345 
 (0.103) (0.220) 
Number of Lead Arrangers -1.099*** -1.286*** 
 (0.127) (0.286) 
Number of Participants -0.171*** -0.240*** 
 (0.016) (0.030) 
Constant 12.698*** 9.386*** 
 (1.198) (2.777) 
Borrower Fixed Effect  





Observations 48,134 88,82628 
R-squared 0.679 0.714 
